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The spirit of American legal realism lives on in Laurence Claus’s
Law’s Evolution and Human Understanding.1 Like the realists,2 Claus
offers a prediction theory of law, in which statements about the law are
forecasts of people’s behavior and attitudes.3 Claus’s tone, like the
realists’, is iconoclastic. He breaks from traditional approaches in the
field. The tradition, it appears, would agree. After all, were prediction
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1. LAURENCE CLAUS, LAW’S EVOLUTION AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (2012).
2. See Michael Steven Green, Leiter on the Legal Realists, 30 LAW & PHIL. 381,
409–16 (2011) (discussing the realists’ prediction theory of law).
3. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 2.
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theories not famously rejected by H.L.A. Hart in his critique of “rulescepticism” in Chapter 7 of The Concept of Law?4
But is the iconoclasm more apparent than real? Just how different is a
prediction theory of law from Hart’s? Indeed, how different can they be,
given that both are positivist, in the sense that the existence and content
of the law ultimately depend solely upon social facts? Does it not follow
from positivism that someone making a statement about the law is
predicting that the requisite social facts upon which the law depends are
currently in place?
In my remarks here, I will try to defend Claus’s iconoclastic tone by
identifying the important difference between prediction theories of law
and Hart’s. I start with a number of distinctions. By a prediction theory
of law I mean a theory under which a statement about the law, such as
“The Securities Exchange Act is valid law,” is a prediction of the behavior
and attitudes of people in a community. In addition to offering this theory,
Claus tacks on what I will call a prediction theory of lawmaking, under
which the words uttered or written by lawmakers are themselves essentially
predictions of people’s behavior and attitudes. The Securities Exchange
Act, Claus argues, was a prediction on the part of Congress concerning
what Americans would think and do. Besides being highly implausible,
I argue that Claus’s prediction theory of lawmaking does not follow
from the other positions that he takes in his book.
Having set aside Claus’s prediction theory of lawmaking, I then
distinguish Claus’s and the realists’ prediction theories of law from other
jurisprudential positions that were targeted by Hart in Chapter 7 of The
Concept of Law. That Hart rejected these other positions does not mean
that he rejected prediction theories of law.
I then briefly explore whether prediction theories of law are unlike
Hart’s because they do not treat a rule of recognition as essential to law.
Although this reading might account for some of Hart’s criticisms of the
realists’ prediction theory, it cannot explain how Claus’s theory is different
from Hart’s, for Claus’s theory also appears to rely upon the idea of a
rule of recognition.
I then discuss what I believe is the fundamental reason Hart rejected
prediction theories. For Hart, it is essential to law that officials take the
internal point of view, which means that they use internal legal statements.
Under prediction theories, not only is the internal point of view not
necessary for law, internal legal statements are morally suspect. I conclude
by arguing that Claus was right to adopt an iconoclastic tone. By

4.
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rejecting the internal point of view, his theory of law, like the realists’,
presents an important challenge to traditional positivism.
I. DISTINGUISHING CLAUS’S PREDICTION THEORY OF LAW
FROM HIS PREDICTION THEORY OF LAWMAKING
Under Claus’s theory of law, laws are words.5 But which words are
law? Why is the United States Constitution law, rather than, say, the
Articles of Confederation? According to Claus, when we say that the
United States Constitution is law, we are predicting that the words in the
Constitution will have systematic effects upon people’s behavior and
attitudes.6 Creating these effects is the fundamental purpose of law. Law
increases our capacity to anticipate one another’s behavior and attitudes.
And that, generally, is a good thing.
This is Claus’s prediction theory of law. But Claus also claims that
those words that make up the law are themselves essentially predictions
of people’s behavior and attitudes.7 Let us call this a “prediction theory
of lawmaking.” Under the prediction theory of lawmaking, the Securities
Exchange Act was itself a prediction by Congress—although it was a
special kind of prediction—because it was “self-fulfilling” in the sense
that it “shape[d] the actions and expectations of people in [the American]
community.”8 When Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act, its
very prediction of Americans’ actions and expectations caused the
prediction to be true.
I think Claus’s prediction theory of lawmaking is clearly wrong. What is
more, it does not appear to follow from other positions that Claus takes
in his book. Or so I shall briefly argue.
Claus’s book has a number of themes, some critical and others
constructive. One critical theme is a rejection of the possibility of
legitimate authority.9 Someone submitting to an authority, he argues, is
short-circuiting her reasoning process in a manner that is not merely
5. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 7–8. I will not discuss Claus’s decision to identify
words as law rather than, say, norms or other propositional objects. This causes problems for
him later when he speaks of laws that, as he puts it, “do not now derive legal status from
showing up in the sequences of signals that emanate from our leaders”—such as customs
that are law. Id. at 153.
6. See id. at 6–7.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 7.
9. See, e.g., id. at 38–44.
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irrational but also morally reckless, because she is now insensitive to the
moral reasons for action binding her conduct.10 He argues, therefore, that
legitimate authority, in the sense of a because-I-said-so moral right to be
obeyed, is impossible.11 Claus’s skepticism extends even to Raz’s service
conception of authority,12 which was crafted precisely to overcome the
worry that submission to authority is irrational and morally suspect.
In part because he finds the notion of legitimate authority incoherent,
Claus argues—also contra Raz—that it is not essential to the law that it
claim such authority.13 We can describe law as existing even in
circumstances where lawmakers claim no because-I-said-so right to be
obeyed. After all, it would be odd if law could exist only in situations
where people claim something that is impossible.
Concerning this critical theme, I think quite a few philosophers of law
would be sympathetic. To the extent that submission to authority, including
in its Razian incarnation, means not acting in accordance with the balance
of reasons of which one is aware, many find such submission irrational and
morally suspect.14 And plenty of philosophers—including some who
think that legitimate authority is possible—would also say that it is not
essential to law that lawmakers claim legitimate authority in this sense.15
But from the success of Claus’s criticisms of the possibility of legitimate
authority, the most we can conclude about the law is that it does not
essentially purport to possess legitimate authority. Claus wishes to argue
for two stronger positions: (1) that laws are not essentially instructions
about how people ought to behave;16 and (2) the prediction theory of
lawmaking, that is, that laws are essentially predictions of people’s
behavior and attitudes.17 I believe I understand why he adopts the first
position. Why he adopts the second is a bit of a mystery to me, but he
apparently thinks that it follows from his prediction theory of law—the
idea that words are law only because they have systematic effects upon
people’s behavior and attitudes.18
Let us begin with the first position. Even if lawmakers cannot have
authority, in the sense of some short-circuiting because-I-said-so moral

10. See id. at 63–65.
11. See id. at 29.
12. See id. at 88–91.
13. See id. at 6.
14. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611 (1991).
15. See, e.g., Kenneth Einar Himma, Law’s Claim of Legitimate Authority, in
HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 271, 293–94
(photo. reprint 2005) (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
16. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 25.
17. See id. at 3.
18. See id.
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right to be obeyed, we still might have a moral duty to obey the law that
should be factored into our determination of what we, all things considered,
ought to do. The fact that a lawmaker says X might bring into existence
or trigger a moral reason to X, although this duty of obedience will surely
be only pro tanto, that is, capable of being overridden by other moral
duties.
Claus recognizes this. True, he is skeptical about some arguments for
a duty to obey the law, such as the argument from consent.19 But he
often says that we have a moral reason to act in accordance with the law,
because it is good to have an effective legal system and disobedience
will undermine the system.20 Indeed, he sometimes appears to argue that
this consequentialist duty to obey the law is general—with respect to
every law of every possible legal system, everyone subject to the law has
a pro tanto duty of obedience. He argues, for example:
The good of having the legal system is the one reason for conforming to the
words we call law that applies because those words are law. On various
occasions, we may well have other good reasons for doing what law’s words
happen to predict we will do, but those other reasons do not come distinctively
from the fact that the words are law.21

In keeping with this position, Claus appears to argue that the pro tanto
duty of obedience existed even concerning Nazi law22 and that it currently
exists concerning laws that have a negligible probability of enforcement.23
For the record, if that is Claus’s position, I think he is mistaken. There
are circumstances in which disobedience—for example, in secret—does
not threaten the effectiveness of a legal system.24 In such cases, the goal
of preserving the system is irrelevant to whether one should obey the
law. But regardless of whether Claus thinks there is a general duty to
obey the law, there clearly can sometimes be such a duty. Thus, he cannot
point to the incoherence of a duty to obey the law as a reason that laws
are not essentially directions to people about how they ought to behave.
19. See id. at 30–32.
20. See, e.g., id. at 51–52, 75.
21. Id. at 79–80. Another piece of evidence is what Claus says about customs in
general: “Conforming to customs always has at least one thing to be said for it—the
good of keeping the customs alive.” Id. at 153.
22. See id. at 79.
23. See id. at 21–22, 77–78.
24. For a criticism of such consequentialist arguments for a moral duty to obey the
law, see M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE
L.J. 950, 964–69 (1973).
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Consider the following analogy. Assume no one knows which side of
the road to drive on and they are not in a position to communicate a
solution to this coordination problem to one another. I alone have a
means of signaling a solution—by skywriting. Having skywritten “left,”
everyone has a reason to think that everyone else will drive on the left.
This fact gives each of them a moral duty to drive on the left, as a means
of avoiding accidents. Because that is the case, why can I not skywrite
“left” not merely to solve the coordination problem but also to express
my (correct) view that people have a moral duty to do what I say? Why
can I not mean by “left” that people ought to drive on the left? In saying
that people ought to drive on the left, I need not attribute to myself a
because-I-said-so moral right to be obeyed, for I can freely admit that
people have a moral duty to do what I say only because I am positioned
to solve the coordination problem. I am not asking people to act contrary to
the moral reasons for action of which they are aware. I am merely
expressing the fact that my words happen to generate or trigger moral
reasons for action.
Although Claus’s prediction theory of law is not, or not solely, a
coordination theory,25 under his theory, law is similar to the word “left”
in my example. Words are law because of their systematic effects on
people’s behavior and attitudes, and given that they have these effects,
they can give people a moral reason to act in accordance with what the
words say. Thus, I see no reason why the words that are law might not
be uttered to express the lawmakers’ view that, given the systematic
effects of their words on the population, people have a moral duty to
follow what the words say. And given that the words might be uttered
with this purpose, a theory of law in which it is essential that laws be
uttered with this purpose might still be true. Laws might essentially be
directions to people about what they ought to do.
Although Claus is not as clear on this point as he might be, my guess
is that he considers such a conceptual limitation on law unreasonable,
given his account of law’s essential function.26 Law can perform its
function even if lawmakers claim no moral duty to do what they say.27
Let us assume that Claus is right. Even if he is, his second position
would not follow. There remains no reason to think that the words that
are laws are themselves predictions. They are laws by virtue of having

25. From what I can tell, Claus thinks that the benefits of the systematic effects
that law has on people’s behavior and attitudes extend beyond solving coordination
problems.
26. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 4–7.
27. See id. at 13–14.
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systematic effects, but that does not make them predictions of those
effects.
Consider, once again, my skywriting “left.” I wrote that word because
of the effects that it will have on the population. It does not follow that
in writing “left” I was saying, “I predict people will drive on the left.” If
that is true of my word “left,” why can we not say the same thing about
the words that make up the law?
It is worth noting that American legal realists, who held a prediction
theory of law, did not hold a prediction theory of lawmaking. To be
sure, they spoke of legal rules as predictions.28 But they were talking
about legal rules understood as descriptions of the law. They did not speak
of statutes, judicial decisions, and the like as themselves predictions. What
the realists concluded from their prediction theory of law—and perhaps
what Claus should conclude as well—is that laws are essentially social
events created to have predictable effects on the population.29
Indeed, by treating laws as predictions rather than just signals, Claus
apparently commits himself to the view that the propositional content of
laws must somehow describe their systematic effects. But there is no reason
to think that is the case. A law saying that people ought to drive 65 miles
per hour might predictably lead them to drive 75 miles per hour and be
enacted precisely with the intention that they drive 75 miles per hour. It
would be a serious distortion to treat the law as a prediction that people
will drive 65 miles per hour. Here the legal realists were ahead of Claus,
for it was a theme of the realists that the content of laws should be
understood not on the basis of what the laws say but in the light of their
effects within the relevant population.30
Let us set aside, therefore, Claus’s prediction theory of lawmaking. In
the rest of my comments, my focus will be his and the realists’ prediction
theory of law—their view that someone making a statement about the
28. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 847 (1935) (“[L]egal rules are simply formulae describing
uniformities of judicial decision.”).
29. Id. at 843 (“A judicial decision is a social event. Like the enactment of a
Federal statute, or the equipping of police cars with radios, a judicial decision is an
intersection of social forces: Behind the decision are social forces that play upon it to
give it a resultant momentum and direction; beyond the decision are human activities
affected by it.”).
30. For a discussion of this theme in Felix Cohen’s writings, see Michael S.
Green, Felix Cohen on Legislation, in 1 THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION
113, 125–28 (Pierre Brunet et al. eds., 2013).
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law is predicting the likely behavior and attitudes of people in a community.
To what extent does a prediction theory of law differ from Hart’s?
II. DISTINGUISHING A PREDICTION THEORY OF LAW FROM A
DECISION THEORY OF LAW, AN OPINION THEORY OF
LAW, AND A THEORY OF LEGAL INDETERMINACY
We cannot conclude that Hart’s theory of law was different from a
prediction theory simply because Hart criticized the realists in Chapter 7
of The Concept of Law, for much of this criticism was directed at other
positions that the realists took—or that Hart claimed they took.
One of Hart’s targets is what can be called the decision theory of law,
that is, a theory under which the law concerning any set of facts is whatever
judgment will be issued by the court that gets the case.31 As Hart himself
noted, decision theories of law are generally motivated by judicial
supremacy—the fact that a judgment is binding, unless overturned on
appeal, even if the court that issued the judgment misapplied or
misinterpreted the law.32 From judicial supremacy the decision theorist
concludes that the law is the court’s judgment itself, since that judgment,
and not the legal rule the court misapplied, is what officials are bound to
enforce.
Understood as a theory of law, that is, an account of what is essential
to law in every possible legal system, the decision theory is an obvious
nonstarter. After all, it is not necessary to a legal system that it have judicial
supremacy. Officials might be legally licensed, or obligated, to ignore
an otherwise valid judgment because the judge that issued it misapplied
the law.33 Concerning such legal systems, the decision theory would
have nothing to say. What is more, as Hart himself noted, the decision
theory cannot explain all the law even in those legal systems that have
judicial supremacy, for it cannot account for the law that identifies the
items to which the decision theory seeks to reduce the law, namely the
binding judgments of courts.34
Granted, in certain cases judicial supremacy might apply even to
judgments that misapply the law that identifies binding judgments. For

31. For the distinction between a decision and a prediction theory of law, see Green,
supra note 2, at 400–10.
32. See, e.g., HART, supra note 4, at 145–46; Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court,
2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2001).
33. Indeed, even in the American legal system it is arguably the case that judgments
that involve egregious misapplications of the law are not legally binding. See Michael
Steven Green, Legal Revolutions: Six Mistakes About Discontinuity in the Legal Order,
83 N.C. L. REV. 331, 402–03 (2005).
34. See HART, supra note 4, at 136.
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example, a judgment in which a court erroneously held that it had
jurisdiction—and so the capacity to issue a binding judgment—might be
treated as binding despite this error.35 Courts have, it is said, jurisdiction to
determine their own jurisdiction.36 But they have this power only if they
satisfy threshold jurisdictional requirements, concerning which judicial
supremacy does not apply. If these threshold requirements are not satisfied,
officials will treat the putative judgment as a nullity. It is for this reason
that I do not have the power to issue binding judgments, even if I declare
that I have such power. The decision theory cannot account for this
threshold law.
The only charitable way of reading the decision theory is not as a
theory of law but as a theory about the consequences of judicial supremacy.
In areas where judicial supremacy applies, the decision theory concludes
that the law is the court’s judgment. As Hart correctly argued, however,
the decision theory, so understood, is still flawed, for it is unable to make
sense of how a court can misapply the law.37 If the law is simply the court’s
judgment, the court cannot make a mistake with respect to the law.
But however the decision theory is understood—as a flawed theory of
law or a flawed theory about the consequences of judicial supremacy—it
is not the prediction theory. Indeed, Claus’s prediction theory can explain
why Hart’s criticism of the decision theory is correct. Assume, for example,
that a court decides that an oral agreement between Smith and Jones is a
binding contract, even though, under the applicable statute of frauds, the
agreement is not binding because it is not in writing. Claus can argue
that the judge’s decision deviated from the law because it is contrary to
the statute’s predicted effect on the behavior and attitudes of people in the
community. The judgment is not what we predicted would happen, given
the statute’s existence. But he can also argue that the judgment is binding
despite its error on the basis of the judgment’s predicted effects.
The same points are true of the American legal realists. Although
some realists—particularly Jerome Frank38—offered a decision theory of
law, the most temperate and philosophically sophisticated among them
advocated a prediction theory similar to Claus’s. Felix Cohen, Walter
35. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115 (1963); McCormick v. Sullivant,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192, 199 (1825).
36. E.g., United States v. Reyes-Platero, 224 F.3d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000).
37. See HART, supra note 4, at 141–47.
38. See Green, supra note 2, at 403–05; Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as
Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1966–67 (2005).
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Wheeler Cook, and Karl Llewellyn all spoke of the law, not in terms of
the particular judgment that a court would issue concerning a set of
facts, but in terms of patterns of conduct that include not merely judges
but also other officials.39 Any judgment that is contrary to those patterns
is contrary to the law.40
The prediction theory should also be distinguished from what can be
called an opinion theory of law. Hart focused on weak judicial supremacy
—the fact that a judgment, say that Smith is liable to Jones for $100,000,
is binding upon officials even if the judge who issued the judgment
misapplied the law. He did not consider a stronger form of judicial
supremacy, in which the interpretation of the law in the court’s written
opinion is binding upon other officials going forward. There is strong
judicial supremacy in the American legal system, for example, with
respect to Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution. Officials
are obligated to enforce the interpretation in circumstances unrelated to
the concrete case in which it was articulated.41
One might conclude that in those areas where strong judicial supremacy
applies, the law simply is what the Court says it is, in the sense that the
Court cannot make a mistake about the law.42 Regardless of whether the
opinion theory is correct, however, it is not the prediction theory, for the
opinion theory, like the decision theory, is not a theory of law. It has
nothing to say about legal systems without strong judicial supremacy.
39. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT
LAWS 33 (1942) (“[W]e must as always guard ourselves against thinking of our
assertion that ‘rights’ and other legal relations ‘exist’ or have been ‘enforced’ as more
than a conventional way of describing past and predicting future behavior of human
beings—judges and other officials.”); Felix S. Cohen, The Problems of a Functional
Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. REV. 5, 8 (1937) (“Applied within the ﬁeld of law itself, [the
functional] approach leads to a deﬁnition of legal concepts, rules, and institutions in
terms of judicial decisions or other acts of state-force.”); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 456 (1930) (“[T]he focus, the
center of law, is not merely what the judge does . . . but what any state official does,
officially.”).
40. Claus himself recognizes this similarity between his prediction theory and the
realists’. But he suggests that the realists erred by focusing exclusively on officials
rather than the population as a whole. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 100. The realists
were closer to Claus’s theory of law than he realizes, however, for they too recognized
that a statement about the law entails predictions not merely about official behavior but
also about the general population. See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and
Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457, 476 n.54 (1924) (“If, for
example, a majority of the community were not in the habit of acquiescing in the acts of
the officials, there would be not law but the absence of law.”).
41. The Supreme Court declared that its constitutional rulings are binding in this
stronger sense in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
42. Something like the opinion theory is arguably evident in Claus’s book. See
CLAUS, supra note 1, at 177–81.
OF
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Nor can it explain all the law even in legal systems, like our own, with
such supremacy because even in those systems there must be some law
identifying the opinions to which supremacy is assigned. Concerning that
law, strong judicial supremacy cannot apply. Rather than being a theory
of law, the opinion theory is a theory about the consequences of strong
judicial supremacy.
Another of Hart’s targets in Chapter 7 of The Concept of Law concerns
the realists’ claims about the scope of legal indeterminacy.43 Hart criticized
the realists for exaggerating the indeterminacy of the law, that is, the
extent to which the law can justify more than one outcome in a case on a
particular assumption about the facts.44 Because law is pervasively
indeterminate, the realists allegedly argued, courts must always rely
upon extra-legal considerations—in particular, perceptions of fairness.45
Whether Hart was right about the realists can be questioned.46 In any
event, the prediction theory is distinct from claims about global legal
indeterminacy. Even if the law were completely determinate, in the sense
that it always recommended a unique decision to a judge adjudicating a
case, the prediction theory could still be true. Claus himself makes no
extravagant claims about legal indeterminacy. And a number of legal
realists—most notably Cohen, Cook, and Llewellyn—advocated a
prediction theory despite believing that the law is often determinate.47

43. See HART, supra note 4, at 124–36.
44. See id.
45. See B RIAN L EITER , Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized
Jurisprudence, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 15, 24 (2007).
46. See BRIAN LEITER, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, in
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM
IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 45, at 59, 73–79.
47. Indeed, Cohen criticized his fellow realists, especially Jerome Frank, for
exaggerating the extent of legal indeterminacy. See FELIX S. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS
AND LEGAL IDEALS: AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL CRITICISM 237–38 (1933);
Cohen, supra note 28, at 823, 842–44.
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III. HOW CLAUS’S PREDICTION THEORY OF LAW IS SIMILAR
TO HART’S THEORY OF LAW
With these distinctions in mind, to what extent is a prediction theory,
properly understood, different from a standard positivist theory such as
Hart’s? Indeed, how different can they be given that under both theories
the existence and content of the law is fundamentally a matter of social
facts about a community?
For Hart, two social facts are essential to a norm’s being law.48 The
first is the existence of a practice among officials of accepting a set of
ultimate criteria for identifying norms that can be backed up by official
power.49 The second is efficacy, in the sense that there is general, although
not necessary total, obedience by the population to the mandatory norms
identified by the rule of recognition.50
Notice that, for Hart, the law ultimately depends upon current social
facts, not past facts.51 To be sure, acts of lawmaking can have occurred
in the past. But they are acts of lawmaking only because there is a current
rule of recognition identifying them as such. Thus, anyone making a
statement that a norm is law must be predicting, on the basis of evidence
from the past, that the requisite social facts are still in place. That the
prediction is easy, setting aside cases of revolutionary transition, does not
mean it is not occurring. We have reason to believe, therefore, that Hart’s
theory of law is itself a prediction theory.
One could try to distinguish Hart’s theory of law from a prediction theory
in the following way: under a prediction theory, statements about the law
predict only the behavior of officials in a community, whereas Hart’s
theory takes into account social facts about behavior and attitudes, both
official and popular. But Claus is explicit that words are law due to their
systematic effect on attitudes as well as behavior.52 And despite their
occasional behaviorist language, the realists—Underhill Moore excepted—
did not take a purely behaviorist approach.53 It is very likely that the
realists also would have accepted that legal statements predict attitudes,

48. See HART, supra note 4, at 94, 116–17.
49. See id. at 94. Like Hart, I will use the term rule of recognition sometimes to
refer to the practice and sometimes to refer to the criteria. Hart also requires that
officials take the internal point of view toward the rule of recognition. I will discuss this
requirement in Part IV, infra.
50. See id. at 116–17.
51. See, e.g., id.
52. Claus repeatedly speaks of words as law because they accurately predict not
just what people will do but also what people will expect of us. See, e.g., CLAUS, supra
note 1, at 3–4, 9.
53. See LEITER, supra note 45, at 24 n.49.
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not just behavior. They would not have said that a legal system exists if
they found out that all of its participants were robots.
A more promising way to distinguish Hart’s theory of law from
prediction theories is that Hart’s theory looks to a rule of recognition.
A norm can be law if it is identified as law by the rule of recognition,
even if it has no effect upon people’s behavior and attitudes in other
respects. In focusing on a rule of recognition, Hart is able to explain
how a norm can be law despite being routinely violated by those subject
to it. A speed limit that everyone ignores can be the law under Hart’s
theory because it satisfies the criteria in the rule of recognition.
In addition, Hart’s theory can explain why a norm can be law even if it
has no actual effect upon courts’ decisions. An example is the rule for
personal jurisdiction over out of state corporations articulated in Justice
Cardozo’s opinion in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,54 under which a
corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in state court if the corporation
is present within the state. As Felix Cohen masterfully argued, this rule
failed to provide any concrete recommendations to judges. In the end,
their personal jurisdiction decisions were based upon other, nonlegal
criteria, such as the burden on the corporate defendant of appearing in
the forum state and the burden on the plaintiff of travelling to the
defendant’s state of incorporation or principal place of business.55 Hart’s
theory is able to explain why the Tauza rule, despite having no effect on
the outcome of personal jurisdiction cases, is still the law.56
Hart’s theory can also explain why a norm that is routinely enforced
by officials, but not identified as law by the rule of recognition, is not
law.57 Consider, for example, an obligation of good faith in contractual
dealing, which Karl Llewellyn thought regularly motivated decisions in
contract cases even before it was explicitly identified as law in the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).58 Under Hart’s theory, the
obligation was not the law before the U.C.C., because it did not satisfy
the criteria in the rule of recognition.59
I think it is clear that, to some extent, the legal realists offered a theory
of law that diverged from a rule of recognition theory. Some realists
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917).
See Cohen, supra note 28, at 809–12.
See HART, supra note 4, at 97.
See id. at 116–17.
See LEITER, supra note 45, at 30.
See HART, supra note 4, at 100.
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would say that the Tauza rule was not the law because it had no effect on
official decisionmaking.60 And some would say that the obligation of good
faith in contractual dealing was the law because it did have such an effect.61
In offering this theory of law, however, the realists recognized that they
were diverging from the normal concept of law.62 Frank drew a distinction
between the law as he thought it should be understood and “formal law.”63
And Llewellyn described as “paper rules” those rules that “have been
treated, traditionally, as rules of law.”64
But what about Claus’s prediction theory? At times it appears that he
too does not consider rules of recognition to be relevant to identifying
the law. He allows that law can exist even when there is no rule of
recognition or indeed identifiable officials. Law exists “anywhere humans
have talked to each other enough to form a group identity.”65
Although I found the question remarkably difficult to answer, I think
that in the end, Claus does offer something like a rule of recognition
theory. In a large community, law is systematized in the sense that “[l]aw
signals who in law’s community is likely to be effective at issuing selffulfilling predictions that shape the actions and expectations of people in
that community.”66 This signaling of effective signalers sounds like a rule
of recognition. As Claus puts it, someone is a “lawgiver so long as the
actual customs that constitute the group’s identity include a custom of
treating what she says as signaling what those in the group are likely to
do and to expect.”67
For this reason, Claus is not like the realists in identifying all regular
determinants of official decisionmaking as law. He does note that
sometimes “those within the very institutions that issued the law on the
60. See Green, supra note 38, at 1993–96.
61. See id.
62. The realists probably recommended a change in the concept of law because it
was in keeping with their other reformist tendencies. In general, they wished to improve
the law in the books by incorporating into that law the nonlegal considerations that were
actually driving judicial decisionmaking. As we have seen, Llewellyn’s proposed reform
of the U.C.C. to include an obligation of good faith and the Supreme Court’s reform of
personal jurisdiction over corporations in International Shoe and its progeny are
examples. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Llewellyn,
supra note 39, at 434. But rather than just pursuing this reform in a piecemeal fashion,
they also sought to do so more efficiently by reforming the concept of law itself to
identify as law all and only systematic determinants of official decisionmaking, regardless of
whether they were in the paper rules. For a discussion, see Green, supra note 2, at 406–
07; Green, supra note 38, at 1993–96.
63. See Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 648–63 (1932).
64. Llewellyn, supra note 39, at 448.
65. CLAUS, supra note 1, at 4.
66. Id. at 7.
67. Id. at 14.
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books consistently act in ways that differ from what the law on the
books signals.”68 But he does not suggest that that makes the deviant
patterns of behavior law.69 First they need to be identified as law by the
rule of recognition. They are law when “these patterns of differing behavior
become talked about in ways that spread the word about what is really
likely to be done and expected.”70
IV. HOW CLAUS’S PREDICTION THEORY OF LAW IS DIFFERENT
FROM HART’S THEORY OF LAW
What then is the difference between Claus’s theory of law and Hart’s?
Because under Hart’s theory identifying the law depends fundamentally
upon predictions of social facts, it would appear that Hart should understand
statements about the law as these predictions. “The Securities Exchange
Act is valid law” would be roughly equivalent to “The Securities Exchange
Act satisfies the criteria employed in the rule of recognition in the United
States and the mandatory norms identified by those criteria are generally
obeyed.”
But Hart did not adopt such an approach.71 For Hart, “The Securities
Exchange Act is valid law” is, at least when uttered by an official in the
American legal system, an internal legal statement,72 whereas a descriptive
statement about the social facts upon which a legal system is based is
external.73 In an internal statement, acceptance of the rule of recognition
is expressed.74 In this way, Hart sought to explain why someone speaking
about the law uses normative terminology75 and takes his statement to
entail reasons for action.76 Nor can we understand internal legal statements
as descriptions of the rule of recognition—and the other social facts
upon which law is based—plus the expression of acceptance of the rule.
68. Id. at 161.
69. See, e.g., id.
70. Id.
71. See HART, supra note 4, 104.
72. See id. at 102.
73. See id. at 103.
74. See id. at 102.
75. Examples are “You [legally] ought . . . to” or “You have a [legal duty].” Id. at
57, 90.
76. See Kevin Toh, Hart’s Expressivism and His Benthamite Project, 11 LEGAL
THEORY 75, 82 (2005) (discussing the connection for Hart between “a judge’s judgment
that a law exists, on the one hand, and his taking or considering the law as providing him
with a reason or justification for punishing [an] offender, on the other.”).
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In internal legal statements, the social facts upon which the law ultimately
depends are presumed, not described.77 Indeed, Hart argues that someone
who speaks of the presupposed social facts cannot be talking about legal
validity at all.78 The crucial difference between Claus’s prediction theory of
law and Hart’s, therefore, is that Claus’s theory dispenses with the internal
point of view, for it is through internal statements that participants in a
legal system manifest that point of view.79
To be sure, Claus says his theory accommodates the internal point of
view, which he describes as the idea that people who live inside a legal
system “view the details of the law not just as interesting facts about the
world but as relevant to what they and other insiders should do.”80 The
only disagreement he has with the internal point of view as Hart describes it
is that Hart thought “people might have all sorts of reasons for holding
the internal point of view, but the important fact about legal systems was
that people on the inside did in fact share the view.”81 Claus, in contrast,
argues that moral considerations—in particular the value of doing what
the law signals as a means of “preserving and promoting law’s effectiveness
at helping us understand each other”—are what are essential to the internal
point of view.82
But taking the law to be morally relevant to what one ought to do is
not enough for the internal point of view. Consider Judge Claus, who is
adjudicating a Securities Exchange Act action. He reasons as follows:
The Securities Exchange Act is a set of words that were first spoken back in
1934 by a set of people who call themselves “Congress.” There is a signaling
system in place among Americans, which causes Congress’s words to have
systematic effects on Americans’ behavior and attitudes. The goal of preserving and
promoting this signaling system is morally important. Although I might have
some moral reservations about acting in accordance with what this set of people
has signaled, the goal of preserving and promoting the signaling system takes
precedence. I will therefore utter the words “judgment against the defendant,”
which, under the signaling system, will themselves have systematic effects on
the behavior and attitudes of Americans—in particular, making it likely that the
defendant will have to pay money to the plaintiff.

Judge Claus unquestionably takes the existence of the law, as understood
by the prediction theory, to be morally relevant to his decision about
what he ought to do. But Hart would not say that he has adopted the

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
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internal point of view.83 This is because he fails to make internal legal
statements: he does not speak of the law using normative language.84
For Judge Claus, the law is described purely in terms of social facts.
Normative language comes into play solely when speaking his moral
obligations concerning those facts.
Because under Hart’s theory it is apparently essential to law that most
officials take the internal point of view, a community in which all officials
were like Judge Claus would apparently not have law, despite the fact
that official and popular behavior would be exactly the same as in a
community with law—the same people would end up paying money, the
same people would wind up in jail, and so on. For Hart, it is crucial to
the existence of law that officials justifying their actions not speak solely
of social facts and nonlegal normative considerations such as morality or
prudence.85 They must speak of law itself in normative terms for law to
exist at all.
One of the reasons that Hart required that officials adopt the internal
point of view is that it helps make sense of legal authority—something
he thought a purely predictive account of the law could not do.86 Hart
did not mean that officials must see lawmakers as possessing a becauseI-said-so moral right to be obeyed. He did not even mean that officials
necessarily thought of themselves as having a moral duty of obedience to
lawmakers. Nevertheless, by taking the internal point of view, officials
could see the lawmakers as having normative powers that would be absent
if they spoke only of social facts and moral reasons for action.
We have now identified an important difference between Claus’s
theory of law and Hart’s. Hart insists that officials must take the internal
point of view, whereas Claus does not. Furthermore, it is not clear to me
that Claus does not have the better of the argument. If one adopts a
positivist approach, under which the existence and content of the law are
ultimately matters of social fact, why not conclude that a nation of Judge
Clauses—who speak about the law solely in terms of social facts—can
have law? One cannot help thinking that Hart, in insisting that officials
take the internal point of view for law to exist, is expressing some deep
unresolved ambivalence about legal positivism itself.

83.
84.
85.
86.

See HART, supra note 4, at 102–03.
See id. at 57, 90.
See id. at 202–03.
See id. at 63.
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There is also a moral argument for the prediction theory. Officials and
private citizens who speak of the law solely in terms of social facts are
more likely to come to a correct conclusion about whether they morally
ought to act as the law says. This argument is clearly evident among the
legal realists. The benefit of a predictive account of the law is, as Felix
Cohen put it, that “we see legal concepts as patterns of judicial behavior,
behavior which affects human lives for better or worse and is therefore
subject to moral criticism.”87 A normative conception of the law, in
contrast, “hides from judicial eyes the ethical character of every judicial
question.”88
Granted, it is not impossible for an official who uses internal legal
statements to reason accurately about when the law ought to be obeyed.
But internal legal statements do seem to be an invitation to moral confusion.
As Hart understands it, the acceptance expressed in such statements may
have its source not merely in moral considerations of various weights but
also in “calculations of long-term interest; . . . an unreflecting inherited or
traditional attitude; or the mere wish to do as others do.”89 If officials
use internal legal statements when justifying their actions, they can lose
sight of which of their reasons for accepting the law are appropriate and
which are morally irrelevant or even pernicious.
A similar moral argument for the prediction theory is evident in Law’s
Evolution and Human Understanding. Thinking about the law as a
signaling system allows for clarity about how the law ought to figure in
our moral reasoning.90 To be sure, a good deal of Claus’s criticism is
directed at the idea of authority in the sense of a because-I-said-so moral
right to be obeyed. But throughout the book one finds suspicion about the
general idea of legal authority—the idea that lawmakers exercise normative
powers of any sort—a notion that Hart attempted to preserve with the
idea of the internal point of view.

87.
88.
89.
90.
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